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are but examples of creativity on the part of the Board. These efforts are en-
countering a somewhat reluctant judiciary. The courts have generally failed to
view all the interests in a given situation. In addition they have applied un-
helpful standards in passing on the orders created by the Board. Nevertheless,
the courts remain the key to more effective remedies if such remedies are to come
from the Board within its present powers and the cooperation of the courts is
therefore essential. An alternative to that means of attaining the goal of more
effective remedies is a broadening of the Board's power through legislative
action. The result of such legislative action is not altogether predictable since
its effectiveness would depend on how the Board would use the new power and
ultimately how the courts would restrict that use. It would seem that Congress
could best contribute to the desired end of effective remedies by encouraging
the Board to continue its efforts under its present mandate. That is, the Board
should be encouraged to continue to fashion remedies which in fact "effectuate
the policies of the Act."
MICHAEL H. STEPHENS
THE KEETON-O'CONNELL PLAN: A CATALYST IN THE SEARCH
FOR A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its advent on the American scene, the automobile has had a profound
impact in the areas of socio-economics and law. In more recent times, the
ubiquitous automobile invades most aspects of normal daily living. Our dynamic
society has grown to consider such means of transportation an almost absolute
necessity. In our cities, houses are being demolished every day so that new roads
can be built to accommodate the increasing automotive traffic burden. And as
more vehicles appear on our highways, the somber prospect is that more accidents
will occur. When this happens, inevitably one's thoughts turn to liability and
insurance.
The general rule of common law liability in most American jurisdictions
compensates victims of automobile accidents based on the concept of fault, i.e.,
any loss incurred by the victim is tecoverable against the party at fault. The
rule of contributory fault imposes the added requirement that an injured party
must be free from culpability in order to recover against a wrongdoer. The
validity of the fault and contributory fault principles have withstood formidable
challenges in the past, but the ground swell of dissatisfaction has never been
more pronounced than in the last three years. One catalyst of this increased
dialogue between the proponents and the opponents of the fault system has
been the proposal formulated by Professor Robert E. Keeton and Professor
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Jeffrey O'Connell1 calling for a complete restructuring of the present system.
The reaction to their plan has been vehement. Trial lawyer organizations are
waging devastating attacks on the proposal.2 The academic community has re-
sponded.3 The insurance industry, a real party in interest in this debate, has
caused evaluation studies to be made.4 The proposed legislation drafted by
Keeton and O'Connell has even been scrutinized by one state legislature.5 To
cite an exhaustive list of the writings on this subject would be a task of herculean
proportions. However, a careful survey of the leading articles indicates that
only extreme positions have been taken.
II. THE FAULT SYST=.
The fault doctrine is "inseparably linked with the philosophy of individual
responsibility."6 Civil liability results when the actor has been guilty of either
intentional or negligent misconduct. However,
this philosophical blueprint was, of course, never fully translated into
the law. Most notably, practical considerations, especially of adminis-
trative convenience, militated in favor of objective standards of care,
rather than the individualistic test whether, given his personality and
1. R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim-A Blueprint
for Reforming Automobile Insurance (1965), is a lengthy volume expanding upon the
authors' original proposal which appeared in two earlier law review articles. See Keeton &
O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile Claims Systems, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 329 (1964); Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection Insurance Act for Claims
of Traffic Victims, 2 Harv. J. Leg. 41 (1965).
2. The American Trial Lawyers Association is so intensely interested in this problem
that it published a 456 page compilation of articles on this subject matter. This volume is
characterized by that association as "an analysis of the Keeton-O'Connell Plan and its effect
on justice and the law showing the bar's concern for protecting the public interest and
welfare." See Justice and the Adversary System (Am. Trial Law. Ass'n ed. 1967).
3. See generally Green, Basic Protection and Court Congestion, 52 A.B.A.J. 926 (1966);
Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus in the Automobile Injury Impasse, 52 A.B.A.J.
533 (1966); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reim-
bursement, 53 Va. L. Rev. 774 (1967); James, The Future of Negligence in Accident Law,
53 Va. L. Rev. 911 (1967); Sargent, Disaster Walks in Guise of Social Reform, Trial, Oct-
Nov., 1967, at 24; see also Symposium in Honor of Charles 0. Gregory, 53 Va. L. Rev. 774
et seq. (1967) ; reprinted in.Justice and the Adversary System, supra note 2, at 19-162.
4. See Kemper, Keeton-O'Connell Plan: Reform or Regression?, Trial, Oct.-Nov., 1967,
at 20. See also other articles appearing in Justice and the Adversary System, supra note 2, at
230-73.
5. The Massachusetts Legislature was the first to consider the Keeton-O'Connell pro-
posal. A bill was submitted to that legislative body closely resembling the model draft form-
ulated by Professors Keeton and O'Connell. Although this bill originally was approved by
the House of Representatives, it was ultimately rejected by the Senate and by the House
on reexamination of the matter. For a discussion of the political implications of Keeton-
O'Connell's consideration and rejection by the Massachusetts Legislature, see Sugarman &
Cargill, The Massachusetts Story: The Public's Reaction, Trial, Oct.-Nov., 1967, at 52;
Dukakis, A Legislator Looks at Proposed Changes, 51 Judicature 163 (1967) (Mr. Dukakis
introduced the "basic protection" bill in the Massachusetts House of Representatives.).
Recently, a similar bill was introduced in the New York State Legislature. The proposed
bill, filed February 6, 1968, would "amend the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to estab-
lishing the motor vehicle basic protection insurance act." S. 3055, A. 4772, N.Y.S. Legis.
(1968).
6. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 Va. L. Rev. 815, 816 (1967).
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capacities, the particular individual had done all that could reasonably
have been expected of him.
7
Incorporated in this principle that an actor ought to be responsible for his wrong-
doing is the rule that the contributory negligence of the injured party will
completely bar recovery. The doctrine of contributory negligence originated in
the early nineteenth century.8 Simply stated, the rule developed that an injured
plaintiff could not recover from another party unless that plaintiff's conduct
was completely free from fault. This limitation on the right to recover was
justified at its inception because
it fitted in with the laissez faire philosophy of the time and the un-
spoken social policy of protecting valuable new industries, particularly
the transportation industry, from the supposedly crippling threat of
large and numerous verdicts imposed by "incurably plaintiff minded"
juries."
The concepts of fault and contributory fault were based in socio-economic
policy. Compensation for injuries to the completely innocent victim of another's
wrongdoing was the aim of this system. The idea of compensation has never
encountered disfavor, and in fact, the modern thrust is toward a broader base
for recovery. However, the doctrine of contributory negligence has undergone
strong attack. The law was prompt in engrafting various exceptions to the
absolute bar to recovery of a contributorily negligent plaintiff.'0 Among these
are the doctrine of last clear chance,'" the relaxation of negligence per se1 2 and
the "willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct exception."'13 Possibly more signifi-
cant is the "grand arbiter" phenomenon evidenced by selected studies of jury
verdicts.' The most dramatic proof of the disfavor of the contributory fault
doctrine is the modern trend toward comparative negligence.' 8
7. Id. at 817.
8. One of the first cases alluding to the doctrine of contributory negligence was
Butterfield v. Forester, 11 East 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
9. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform,
11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 135, 143 (1958).
10. Id. at 145.
11. Id. at 145-48. Generally the rule of "last clear chance" shifts the burden of loss
"from a contributorily negligent plaintiff to a defendant whose negligence follows that of the
plaintiff." See also Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 472 (1953).
12. Id. at 148-49. The doctrine of negligence per se has been relaxed in instances re-
quiring the determination of contributory negligence. In automobile accident cases especially,
statutory violations by the plaintiff will not be kept from the jury. See also James, Contribu-
tory Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691, 724 (1953).
13. Id. at 149-52. "Willful, wanton or reckless misconduct" of the defendant might
make plaintiff's lesser misconduct irrelevant to recovery. For further discussion, see generally
James, supra note 12, at 709-12.
14. There is a proclivity of juries to ignore the full effect of the contributory negligence
rule when its application would completely bar recovery from a slightly negligent plaintiff.
This phenomenon has been substantiated by experimental studies. See H. Kalven, Report on
the Jury Project, Conference on Aims and Methods of Legal Research 28 (Univ. of Mich.
Law School 1955); Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award,
19 Ohio S.L.J. 158, 167-68 (1958).
15. This trend will -be more fully discussed later in notes 28-44 and accompanying
text.
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The "grave indictments" against the fault system have been discussed ex-
tensively.' 6 It is useful, however, to outline the basic criticisms if a comparison
is to be made of the proposed reform alternatives. First, there is a disparity
in the amount of compensation awarded in proportion to the seriousness of
the injury.'7 Despite the occasional well-publicized high awards, generally,
serious losses are not adequately compensated. On the other hand, small loss
claimants often receive more than is warranted by their injury.' 8 Second, in
some jurisdictions the problem of the judgment-proof defendant persists.' 0
Third, compensating payment is very often delayed, especially when litigation
is invoked.20 This imposes a serious financial burden upon an injured party
during the period of delay. This delay invariably places the injured persons
in the lower income groups in a weaker bargaining position for settlement.2 '
Fourth, there are two curious anomalies in the fault system as it applies to
automobile accidents. One is the situation where the two parties were both at
fault; the other situation appears when both parties were completely innocent.
Under the present system, neither party would be entitled to recover in these
situations.22 Fifth, the deterrent aspect of negligence liability has been diluted
by the trend toward distributing losses to the motoring public through liability
insurance.23 Sixth, it is claimed that the present system has encouraged fraudu-
lent claims in connection with automobile accidents. 24 The final criticism usually
asserted is the cost of administering the fault system, especially in the area of
automobile accident liability. However, regardless of what alternative replaces
the present system, it seems likely that the actuaries will dispute the economy
of any plan designed to remedy the benefit gaps in the liability system.2r The
16. See James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An
Unanswered Challenge, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 408 (1959).
17. Id. at 408, noting Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents,
Report to Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences 266 (1932).
18. Id. at 409. In addition, similar losses often are compensated by different awards.
But regardless of the amount, lump-sum payments have been known to be depleted while
further economic losses from the accident continue. Id. at 410.
19. Id. at 409. In New York, the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corpora-
tion Law was enacted to insure innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents compensation
for losses caused by uninsured motorists. See N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 600-26 (Supp. 1967).
20. See James & Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too
Little and Too Late, 26 Conn. B.J. 70 (1952); see also Burger, The Courts on Trial: A
Call for Action Against Delay, 44 A.B.AJ. 738 (1958).
21. James, supra note 16, at 409.
22. Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile
Claims Systems, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 329, 350 (1964). These anomalous situations are good
arguments for the adoption of a comparative negligence rule.
23. Id. at 344. Parenthetically it seems unrealistic to argue that a forty dollar increaso
in liability insurance premiums has the same deterrent effect as bearing the entire liability
out of one's own pocket. See also Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1285 (1952).
24. R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim-A Blueprint
for Reforming Automobile Insurance 1-3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Basic Protection].
25. Compare Harwayne, The Cost of Proposed Changes in Automobile Insurance, in
Justice and the Adversary System, supra note 2, at 164, with Bailey, Fallacies Overshadow
Validity of Plan's Cost Estimates, Trial, Oct.-Nov., 1967, at 45, and R. Wolfrum, The Answer
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aim of reform should be a better system of compensation and not the costs
incident to achieving this reform.
The quest for a better system of compensation in tort liability has already
begun. It is noteworthy that each new step toward reform has been taken in
relation to a specific problem. For example, in the area of products liability,
there is a strong trend toward strict liability.26 Workmen's compensation laws
were enacted to answer the need for compensation in work-connected injuries
2 7
The rule of comparative negligence has been introduced to eliminate the in-
equities of the contributory negligence rule.28
The concept of comparative negligence2 9 replaces the absolute bar to
recovery by the injured party's contributory fault. The comparative negligence
rule divides or apportions damage when both the plaintiff and the defendant
are at fault. A negligent plaintiff will only recover from a defendant an amount
of compensation which reflects the extent to which the defendant's quantum of
fault exceeds his own.
Comparative negligence statutes have taken a number of different forms.
The rule apportioning damages among the culpable parties is the most common
type.3 0 Other statutes provide for apportionment "only where the negligence
of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was gross in
comparison." 31 A third category "provides for apportionment only if the negli-
gence of the plaintiff 'was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought.' "32 The first form of statute exemplifies an appor-
to Plat's Low Cost, Trial, Oct.-Nov., 1967, at 47 in order to understand the disagreement
among actuaries regarding the economy of "basic protection."
26. See Paulsen, Eight Cases After Eight Years, 53 Va. L. Rev. 870, 882-83 (1967),
and James, supra note 3, at 914-16.
27. See, e.g., N.Y. Work. Comp. Law.
28. Recently in New York, a bill was filed in the Senate to amend the Civil Practice
Law and Rules by adopting the comparative negligence rule. S. 1647, N.Y.S. Legis. (1968).
29. For a brief discussion of the development of the comparative negligence doctrine,
see Maloney, supra note 9 at 152-60.
30. A straight apportionment statute is exemplified by the Federal Employer's Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964) which provides:
In all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by railroad
under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for
personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death,
the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not
bar recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to such employee ....
31. An example of a comparative negligence statute requiring the distinction between
"slight" and "gross" negligence is Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (1965) which provides:
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to his prop-
erty caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar recovery when the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was gross in
comparison, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by
the jury in mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory
negligence attributable to the plaintiff ....
32. An example of the third type of comparative negligence statute is Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 895.045 (1966) which provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in
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tionment of damages rule in its purest form. Moreover, this type of statute is
least encumbered by considerations of degrees of fault.
The rule of comparative negligence has been met by several criticisms.
One line of resistance considers the present contributory negligence system
adequate.33 It glorifies the status quo by maintaining that juries can adequately
cope with instructions regarding contributory negligence. It also asserts that
the contributory negligence rule is "a salutory check on the gambling instincts
of the litigating public,"34 calling the contributory negligence rule "the last bar
S.. to complete chaos in our courts." 35 Another objection is raised by those who
fear that "the average verdict and settlement will have to be greater" 36 in order
that plaintiff's recovery, offset by the amount attributable to his own fault, might
be adequate. Still others cite the deterrent effect of the contributory negligence
rule.3 7 Finally, the argument is made that comparative negligence is too com-
plicated to be administered by the average jury,38 especially in multiple party
litigation.
Tenable answers can be advanced in response to these objections. If merely
adequate systems can be improved, reform should not be resisted. Some writers
hold that instructing contributory negligence, especially where the injured plain-
tiff is only slightly negligent, may cause a disrespect for law in the minds of
the jurors.39
It has been found that demands for juries under the present system have
been prompted by the fear that a "judge will apply the contributory negligence
rule literally." 40 Further, there is every reason to believe that a judge will be
as liberal in assessing damages as a jury would be. Since the prime advantage of
a jury under the present system is the determination of liability, adopting the
more equitable comparative negligence system would result in fewer jury trials
and probably a better chance of settlement.41 Thus court congestion would be
significantly relieved.
The deterrence argument is weak. The admonitory function of tort law
in automobile accident cases is no longer a matter of primary concern.4 2 The
injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence
of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering.
33. See Benson, Comparative Negligence-Boon or Bane, 23 Ins. Counsel J. 204 (1956).
34. Id. at 214.
35. Id.
36. See Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y.S.B.
Bull. 291, 299 (1955).
37. See Maloney, supra note 9, at 161.
38. See Benson, supra note 33.
39. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform,
supra note 9, at 162.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 163. See also Bress, Comparative Negligence: Let Us Hearken to the Call
of Progress, 43 A.BAJ. 127, 130 (1957), which indicates that the size of verdicts has not
increased under the comparative negligence system in Wisconsin.
42. Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.,. Rev. 564 (1952).
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fear of serious injury is sufficient deterrence. Apprehension of losing a negligence
lawsuit hardly seems to provide added effect.
Finally, the objections that such a system is too complicated to be adminis-
tered or that the average recovery will be greater is not supported by experience.
43
Jurisdictions which have adopted the rule of comparative negligence are func-
tioning efficiently. 44 Where comparative negligence is the rule, it is advisable
to use the special verdict. In this way the court can determine the extent, if
any, of the jury's confusion in assessing degrees of culpability to the various
parties.
This capsule description of the fault system and the various alternatives
contained therein has been offered so that comparison might be made to a pro-
posal of liability without fault, the examination of which is the main purpose
of this comment. Moreover, this background material forms an essential basis
to the suggestions that will be discussed later.
III. OUTLINE OF NON-FAULT PROPOSALS OMER THAN THE
KEETON-O'CONNELL PROPOSAL
The Keeton-O'Connell plan is a product of the influence exerted by earlier
formulations. This history tends to focus upon the problem of liability versus
compensation without fault. The common denominator of all these plans, in-
cluding Keeton-O'Connell, is a dissatisfaction with the present system and an
attempt at a solution.
The Colunzbia plan of 193245 proposed compulsory limited liability owners'
insurance. Liability was imposed without regard to fault. Payments would be
periodic, based on benefit schedules, but no provision was made to compensate
for pain and suffering or to compensate for the first week of disability. In
addition, property damage was not a compensable expense. The amount of
damages would be ultimately determined by a special board. No protection was
afforded to parties injured by uninsured motorists. Non-resident motorists were
not covered under the plan.
46
43. Maloney, supra note 9, at 161-62.
44. A caveat is appropriate here. The efficient administration of comparative
negligence by the jury system would require avoiding unnecessary joinder of parties.
Multiple party situations only serve to confuse a jury determining comparative fault. More-
over, because separate trials and different juries can determine varying degrees of fault
even though arising out of the same factual situation, a compulsory counterclaim rule
might be utilized in a comparative negligence jurisdiction to finally settle the degree of
fault between a single plaintiff and a single defendant.
45. Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, Report to the Colum-
bia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences (1932). See also Smith, The
Problem and Its Solution, in Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32
Colum. L. Rev. 785 (1932).
46. Professors Keeton and O'Connell have criticized the Columbia proposal because
only damage caused by another vehicle was compensable, because no uninsured motorist
fund was created, and because the payment schedules were inadequate. The first week
deductible feature and the absence of compensation for property damage were also criti-
cized. Basic Protection 133-39.
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The Saskatchewan plan,47 a 1946 Saskatchewan enactment incorporating
liability without fault, covered property damage as well as bodily injury up to
an aggregate sum of $35,000. In order that premium rates can be set on a non-
profit basis, this compulsory insurance system is administered by the government.
Loss suffered anywhere in North America by a Saskatchewan motorist is covered
unless the insured was in breach of condition, for example, drunk driving. A non-
resident is not covered for injury suffered while riding in vehicles not registered
in Saskatchewan. Finally, severely injured persons are allowed to seek further
relief through the common law approach.
48
The California State Bar Committee in 1959 proposed4" a compulsory form
of loss insurance very similar to the Saskatchewan Plan except that it would
be implemented by private rather than governmental insurance. The common
law tort remedies would be maintained 0 on the theory that such coverage would
only "furnish financial 'first-aid' to those who may eventually be entitled to
larger compensation." 51
The Ontario Proposal52 of March, 1963, provided for voluntary loss in-
surance superimposed on liability insurance. The availability of a common law
recovery was maintained. Here, too, benefits would be determined by reference
to certain schedules.
58
"Compulsory motor vehicle comprehensive loss insurance,"5 4 proposed by
Professor Leon Green in 1958, was designed to cover all types of loss "except
those resulting from criminal offenses other than traffic violations and attempted
or committed suicide."55 Pain and suffering was not regarded a compensable
loss. There would be a $100 deductible feature, and other monetary limitations
on compensation would be set by a state commission. Compensation would be
paid on a lump-sum basis determined by special masters. The tort action would
be abolished.56
47. Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 371 (1953). The plan is discussed in Saskatchewan Government
Insurance Office, The Automobile Accident Insurance Act (1958).
48. Keeton and O'Connell disagree with the Saskatchewan plan principally because it
is government insurance which would be economically unfeasible in urbanized areas. The
benefit schedules and the retention of the common law remedy were not deemed to have
solved the problem. Basic Protection 141-47.
49. Basic Protection 148.
50. Knepper, Alimony for Accident Victims?, 15 Defense L.J. 512, 521 (1966).
51. Keeton and O'Connell oppose this alternative because it would cause higher costs
and increased litigation. Basic Protection 149-51.
52. Final Report of the Select Committee Appointed on April 5, 1960 to Examine
into and to Report on All Matters Relating to Persons Who Suffer Financial Loss or Injury
as a Result of Motor Vehicle Accidents (1963).
53. Among the criticisms advanced against this solution by Keeton and O'Connell are
the probable higher cost, limited scheduled benefits and the lack of periodic compensation
for partial disability. They also point out that this proposal has not yet been translated
into a legislative draft. Basic Protection 153-58.
54. L. Green, Traffic Victims: Tort Law and Insurance (1958).
55. Knepper, supra note 50, at 522.
56. The basic criticism of this plan is that it is politically impractical because it com-
pletely eliminates common law negligence. Basic Protection 160-64.
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In 1954, Professor Albert Ehrenzweig introduced the concept of Full Aid57
insurance. Furnished by private insurers, this voluntary coverage would "provide
(periodic) benefits based on fixed schedules and paid without regard to fault
or negligence."1s Pain and suffering and property damage would not be covered.




The concept of "basic protection insurance" proposed by Professors Robert
Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell might be considered a conglomeration of selected
aspects of the earlier proposals. Assuming change is justified,60 the question
becomes whether or not the proper "selection" has been made. Moreover, whether
or not other, perhaps even more sweeping, proposals should have been added
is a matter of legitimate inquiry.
The need for some reform is evidenced by the number of plans proposed
to alter our present system. The philosophy of such a proposal is an appropriate
keynote to its examination. The philosophy of "basic protection" has been ex-
pressed by Professor Keeton:
The present automobile insurance system... maakes no provision
for some deserving traffic victims, and too little for others. It delivers
its payments too late. It distributes them unfairly, overpaying victims
with minor injuries and underpaying severely injured persons, if it,
pays them at all.
The unfairness of the present system extends also to harsh treat-
ment of motorists when they buy their insurance. Rates are too high.
Rating classifications are often unfair. And many people have trouble
getting and keeping the insurance they want and need.
On top of all this, the present system has built-in inducements to
exaggeration and even outright fraud that add both to its unfairness
and to its wasteful costs.
61
In order to remedy the flaws in the present system, the Keeton-O'Connell
plan for "basic protection" for traffic victims was proposed. It is a lengthy and
complex series of ideas which were converted into an elaborate draft of a model
statute.62 The breadth of that model draft precludes a section-by-section analysis
57. A. Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim (1954).
58. W. Knepper, supra note SO, at 522.
59. The glaring flaw of this proposal was that the purchase of "full aid" insurance
was voluntary. Basic Protection, at 166-68. See also Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives
on a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 641 (1964) for
a general discussion of these plans.
60. Professor Kalven states that he is "really not persuaded the catalog of woes [with
respect to the present system] is as dismal as they [i.e., its opponents] say it is." Kalven,
Plant's Philosophy Strikes at Heart of Tort Concept, Trial, Oct.-Nov., 1967, at 35, 36.
61. Keeton, Band-Aid Bills or Basic Reform: A Statement to the Joint Committee
on Insurance of the Massachusetts Legislature on March 28, 1967, in justice and the Adver-
sary System 39 (Am. Trial Law. Ass'n ed. 1967).
62. See Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection Insurance Act for Claims of Traflic
Victims, 2 Harv. J. Leg. 41 (1965).
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in a comment such as this. However, its principal features will be considered so
that fair and constructive evaluation is possible.
"Basic protection" coverage is a new form of compulsory automobile in-
surance, somewhat similar to the principle underlying medical payments insur-
ance. Medical payments insurance is a two party system designed to compensate
only certain covered parties by the insurer. This is contrasted to liability in-
surance which is a three party system, i.e., an injured third party seeking to
recover damages from the insurer due to the liability of the insured. "Net eco-
nomic loss" (basically out-of-pocket 63 loss) is covered up to a $10,000 maximum
limit without regard to fault.64 "Basic protection" insureds are granted "an
exemption from tort liability in those cases in which tort damages recoverable
in the absence of this legislation would not exceed 10,000 dollars."0 0 Also, where
recoverable tort damages exceed $10,000, "basic protection" insureds are granted
a credit against the tort recovery to the extent of the "basic protection" benefits
paid. The burden of loss for the first $5,000 in pain and suffering is placed upon
the victim who may purchase "optional" insurance designed to offset such a
loss.66 Tort recoveries for pain and suffering are permitted to the extent of the
excess over the $5,000. exemption. There are certain deductible features such
as a standard deductible which excludes from reimbursable losses the first $100
of net loss of all types or ten percent of work loss, whichever is greater. Property
damage is not within the basic protection plan.
The method of making a claim and receiving payment has also been reno-
vated. Where "basic protection" is involved, the victim may make a claim di-
rectly against the insurer. The optional tort liability insurance retains the three
party claims procedure. After one's claim is perfected, benefits are paid monthly
as losses accrue, unless special circumstances warrant lump-sum payments. The
maximum amount payable on any "basic protection" policy is $10,000 for
injuries to one person in one accident and $100,000 for all injuries in one acci-
dent. There is an additional $750 maximum limit for work loss in any one month.
And finally, notwithstanding these maximum limits, deductions and exclusions,
"basic protection" only covers "net economic loss." "Overlapping with benefits
63. Id. at 51-53. "Loss" is defined as "accrued economic detriment from accidental
injury, consisting of (i) allowable expenses [i., "reasonable charges incurred for reason-
ably necessary products, service and accommodations" including a semiprivate hospital room
and up to $500 for funeral expenses] and (ii) work loss [i.e., loss of income by injured per-
son and the reasonable expense of necessary services] and (ii), if injury causes death,
survivors' loss." Pain, suffering, and inconvenience are not loss. "Net economic loss" gener-
ally is loss less all collateral sources except support payments, life insurance proceeds,
gratuities [except payments made by employer to employee] and amounts received "by
way of succession at death."
64. Id. at 50-51. All accidental injuries are compensable. However, injury caused or
suffered intentionally are only compensable to innocent third parties claiming through the
injury.
65. Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile
Claims Systems, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 329, 357 (1964). Note that the tort exemption does not
apply if the victim dies.
66. Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 62, at 56.
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from other sources is avoided by subtracting these other benefits from gross loss
in calculating net loss.1 '67 One deductible item, for example, is a subtraction from
gross loss up to fifteen percent of loss of income to offset the income tax benefit
incident to "sick pay."68 The collateral source rule, which allows an injured
party damage awards for amounts covered by insurance, is thereby virtually
eliminated.
The proposal also provides for an assigned claims plan69 designed to afford
basic protection benefits "even when every vehicle involved is either uninsured
or a hit-and-run car."1
70
V. THE KEETON-O'CONNELL PLAN: ITS PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS
The case for the proponents of "basic protection"7' is most artfully articu-
lated by its authors. In their writings, the first premise of their argument is an
indication of the flaws in the fault system.72 They argue that "tort law is...
public law"73 as well as private law to justify their theme "that motoring should
be required to pay its way in society. ' 74 Distributing rather than shifting losses
is supported on the grounds of fairness and the proper allocation of resources.
Those who benefit from an activity should bear the burden of its expense. Just
as highway maintenance cost is assessed against the motoring public by certain
taxes, the cost of damage caused by cars should be treated as an operating cost
of motoring. The cost of such compulsory basic protection insurance should then
be considered when deciding whether or not to buy an automobile.75
In making motoring pay its own way through "basic protection" coverage,
Keeton and O'Connell hasten to point out that certain coverage limits have been
suggested in a calculated attempt to minimize the cost. The various deductibles
and exclusions 76 considered together mean that basic protection will cover a
sizable percentage of all automobile accident claims.77 This means, they argue,
that common law recovery which is permitted under the "basic protection"
system will be less expensive, especially the administrative expense incident to
the tort system. In short, basic protection is asserted to be a better system of
compensation at a lower cost.
67. Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 65, at 363.
68. Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 62, at 53-54.
69. Id. at 77-79.
70. Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 65, at 378.
71. A strong voice in favor of the Keeton-O'Connell proposal is Daniel P. Moynihan,
Director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University. See
Moynihan, Are We Ready for a Drastic Change?, Trial, Oct.-Nov., 1967, at 27. Professor
Fleming James has indicated favor for the "compensation" concept. See James, The Colum-
bia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An Unanswered Challenge, 59 Colum.
L. Rev. 408 (1959).
72. Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 65, at 329.
73. Id. at 332.
74. Id. at 345.
75. Id. at 345-48.
76. Id. at 349.
77. Marryott, The Tort System and Automobile Claims: Evaluating the Keeton-
O'Connell Proposal, 52 A.B.A.J. 639, 640-41 (1966).
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As might be expected, there are many who oppose the revolutionary con-
cepts included in the Keeton-O'Connell plan. Its critics can be found among
lawyer groups, the insurance industry and even members of the bench.
One of the most eloquent spokesmen for the opposition is Professor David
Sargent of Suffolk University Law School. He opposes the abolition of the con-
cepts of negligence and contributory negligence. He points out that even a
drunk driver would be compensated by "basic protection" and states that "Keeton
and O'Connell would take money out of the hands of innocent victims and put
it into the pockets of wrongdoers who perpetrated the disaster upon the inno-
cent."7 8 This would violate "the most basic principles of personal responsibility
and fair play." 79 Second, Sargent argues that Keeton and O'Connell have tried
to alleviate the expense objection "by removing almost all the benefits"80 of
insurance. Pointing to the many exclusions and deductions in "basic protection,"
he states that "the cheapest insurance is no insurance: You pay nothing and
you get nothing."8' However, basic protection premiums will be substantial.
Actuarial studies conflict in their prediction regarding the "economy" of the
plan.
8 2
Next, Sargent carefully examines the rationale behind the fixed deductibles
and exclusions. He concludes that these limitations are generally arbitrary. The
exclusion for pain and suffering up to $5,000 is a good example. Keeton and
O'Connell justify this exclusion by contending that pain and suffering are so
intangible that they cannot be measured. Sargent retorts that "if this argument
has any vitality, if pain and suffering really is not measurable, then it is never
measurable. But if it is ever measurable, then it is always measurable."
8 3
Other flaws pointed out by Sargent also bear noting. Keeton-O'Connell
would provide for an exemption from liability, but there is no guaranteed exemp-
tion from being sued and being required to defend a lawsuit.84 In addition,
Keeton-O'Connell might very well aggravate the problem of fraud which it
originally intended to alleviate. This would result from an over-broad definition
of the loss covered. Any economic loss arising out of the ownership maintenance,
or use of a motor vehicle is covered. 5 Finally, Sargent asserts that the burden
of administrative costs and court congestion will not be lightened.80 In short,
Sargent deems "basic protection" an utter failure.
78. Sargent, Exploding a Myth, in Justice and the Adversary System 127 (Am. Trial
Law. Ass'n ed. 1967).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 128.
81. Id.
82. See Justice and the Adversary System 163-229 (Am. Trial Law. Ass'n ed. 1967).
83. Sargent, supra note 78, at 132.
84. Id. at 133.
85. The possibility of fraud has been eliminated by the Keeton-O'Connell proposal.
A situation may be conceived where a basic protection insured falls in the bathtub in his
house, for example, but later claims that the fall was related to the ownership, maintenance
or use of his automobile. Such incidents will be difficult to disprove. See Sargent, supra note
78, at 135.
86. Id. at 136-37.
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The insurance industry has been markedly vocal in this dialogue. The
Kemper Insurance Group actually retained Professors Keeton and O'Connell as
independent consultants in its evaluation of the plan. The results of that evalu-
ation were announced by James Kemper, Jr.87 Basically, the Kemper findings
suggest that the Keeton-O'Connell plan creates more problems than it solves.
Certain aspects of this analysis require some discussion.
The legal staff of the Kemper study group concludes that adopting such a
plan would present more difficult constitutional questions than workmen's com-
pensation did thirty years ago.8 8 Keeton and O'Connell candidly admit that
the plan "is unconstitutional in all of the states whose constitutions prohibit
any limitation of the amount recoverable for injury '8 9
Regulation and rating will create "nightmares" for the respective state
officials and actuaries. 0 Because Keeton-O'Connell is to be adopted on a state-
by-state basis, interstate accident situations will certainly complicate the pic-
ture.91 This study affirms Sargent's opinion that "basic protection" will not
result in reduced insurance premiums. Finally, the incomplete abolition of the
fault system is questioned.92
Two other reactions in the insurance industry must be noted. William
Knepper, chairman of the board of directors of The Defense Research Institute,
93
rejects the abolition of the fault system but finds several of Keeton and O'Connell
ideas worthy of some merit. He suggests that much can be done "to accomplish
savings and efficiency without going to such a radical change as the 'basic pro-
tection' concept."194 If accounting for collateral sources effects economies under
"basic protection," a similar result could be obtained under the present system.
Simplification of existing procedures would decrease cost and hasten compensa-
tion. Knepper concludes that a great deal of reform should be effectuated within
the framework of our present system before we consider such revolutionary alter-
natives.
87. Kemper, An Insurance Executive Looks at Proposed Changes, 51 Judicature 168
(1967).
88. Id. at 170.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 170-71.
91. Id. at 171. The Kemper article notes an example to illustrate the interstate com-
plications:
Assume Michigan has enacted the basic protection plan and Illinois has not:
(a) If a reckless driver from Illinois runs into a tree in Michigan, he
collects basic protection benefits from the Michigan assigned claims fund
which has been financed by money taken from Michigan's motorists.
(b) If an Illinois driver collides in Michigan with a Michigan driver,
both collect basic protection benefits, but the Illinois driver may retain his
right of action in Illinois if he can get service on the Michigan driver.
(c) A Michigan driver who has an accident in Illinois with an Illinois
driver collects basic protection benefits but has a tort action against the Ili-
nois driver, who in turn has a tort action against him.
92. Id.
93. Knepper, Alimony for Accident Victims?, 15 Defense LJ. 512 (1966).
94. Id. at 540.
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Franklin Marryott, Vice President and General Counsel of the Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company,9 5 has also written in behalf of the insurance busi-
ness. His major contribution is the formulation of "the practical, as distinguished
from the philosophical, criteria that might sensibly be applied in judging and
evaluating proposals for changes in the automobile tort system."0 0 These
criteria set a very high standard to be met before change is acceptable. Generally,
the change should be "evolutionary" and "gradual," leaving some "avenue of
retreat" if the change proves to be a mistake. The change should be generally
acceptable to all concerned, and the cost and delay of adequate compensation
should be decreased. However, it may prove very difficult to justify any reform
measured against this standardl
Finally, members of the bench and bar have expressed their respective
viewpoints. The court congestion issue has illicited strong response from the
judiciary. One judge has stated that the Keeton-O'Connell plan is no panacea
for the continuing need for judicial manpower.97 Another judge has heeded the
warning of Dr. Calvin Brainard, Professor and Chairman of the Finance and
Insurance Department of the University of Rhode Island, that "basic protection"
will be the foundation for many new fraudulent claims.
8
Two articles written by three distinguished members of the bar have taken
a refreshing approach to this problem even though they must be included within
the opposition faction. Alfred Conard and J. Ethan Jacobs have written an
article called New Hope for Consensus in the Automobile Injury Impasse.00
Its title aptly describes its theme. Avoiding the common nihilist approach of
easy criticism without attempting affirmative resolution, the authors focus on
the common ground between the "tortists" and the "compensationists."
It seems to the present authors that we need not abandon either
the automobile, the tort law, or public and private insurance in order
to arrive at a reasonable solution. Because they are cheaper, faster and
more complete in their coverage of individuals, nontort reparation
systems should be strengthened where they exist and instituted where
they are lacking. Because the tort system is expensive, crowded, in-
sulated from the nominal defendants but theoretically complete in its
coverage of expenses and damages, it should fill the role of backstop
when other systems do not provide adequate compensation and deter-
rence. It should also be modernized to help promote reasonable and
speedy settlements. Additional measures should be provided to impose
sanctions on careless drivers.100
95. Marryott, supra note 77.
96. Id. at 640.
97. See Letter from the Hon. G. Joseph Tauro, C.J., Sup. Ct., Boston, Mass.,
to Gov. John Volpe, August 29, 1967, in Justice and the Adversary System 279-80
(Am. Trial Law. Ass'n ed. 1967).
98. See Statement Issued by Judge James R. Lawton following an appearance before
Ways and Means Comm. on Mass. Legis., in justice and the Adversary System 283-88 (Am.
Trial Law. Ass'n ed. 1967).
99. Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus in the Automobile Injury Impasse,
52 A.BA.J. 533 (1966).
100. Id. at 538.
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Finally, Jacob Fuchsberg,101 a past president of the American Trial Lawyers
Association, has made several careful observations about basic protection. He
begins by citing statistics which indicate that it is not surprising that insurance
premiums have increased. Given fifteen years of inflationary trends, most funda-
mental items have increased in price. He also notes the standard objections.
However, sensing a need for something more than mere criticism, he continues
to list several noteworthy suggestions. He proposes compulsory liability insurance
with unlimited coverage. A "universal medical payment" feature would be at-
tached to the basic coverage.1 0 2 Comparative negligence would replace contribu-
tory negligence, which is a system he characterized as "a law mostly honored
in the breach."'10 3 People, not cars, should be insured, and victims should be able
to proceed directly against the carrier.10 4 Massive safety campaigns and tough
traffic law enforcement should be instituted. Judicial budgets ought to be in-
creased. Advance payment and rehabilitation programs must be expanded. "An
insolvency insurance fund should be created to cover fly-by-night companies'
defalcations." 10 5 Guest laws and immunity provisions should be eliminated. If
these suggestions are followed, Fuchsberg contends that "financial irresponsibility
would be a thing of the past and meritorious claims would be fully compen-
sated." 6
VI. OTHER POsSIBLE ALTERNATrvEs
It is unfortunate that, with the exception of the last two authors mentioned,
no one has attempted to present a compromise position. That is the theme of
the following suggestions.
The intricacies of "basic protection" create too many gaps. These gaps
have given rise to much criticism. Incorporating simplicity into a proposal might
avoid opening such gaps, and this should be the keynote to any proposed reform.
Comparative negligence should .provide the framework for reform. The
type of comparative negligence 07 rule to be adopted will depend upon the im-
portance assigned to the traditional concept of fault and personal responsibility.
For instance, if one agrees that fault is a minor consideration in compensating
for injury resulting from automobile accidents, then the "pure" type of compara-
tive negligence rule should be adopted. Adopting a comparative approach for
allocating loss will serve the ends of justice with the probability of decreased
cost. In this system, pain and suffering will continue to be regarded as a real
source of damage. However, the feasibility of a fixed ratio of out-of-pocket medi-
cal expense to pain and suffering might be explored. Within this new system,
guest statutes and doctrines of immunity should be abolished. The pleadings
101. J. Fuchsberg, A Lawyer Looks at Proposed Changes, 51 judicature 158 (1967).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 161.
104. Id. at 162.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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and the pre-trial stages of litigation can be expedited and simplified. For example,
in New York the twenty-day limit on the time to answer a complaint is the only
effective attempt to place time limitations on the pleading stage of a lawsuit.108
One solution might be to consolidate the functions of the complaint and the
bill of particulars. Another time limitation might be imposed on the period
between the origination of the lawsuit and the filing of the trial note of issue.
An effective use of a pre-trial conference procedure10 9 would be another im-
provement. A way of encouraging settlement would be to award reasonable
attorney's fees against a defendant-insurer who refused to settle and subsequently
lost at trial, especially when only property damage is involved. Considered in
the context of a direct action provision, such a sanction would prevent the
insurance company from utilizing time as a settlement weapon against a victim
in the weaker bargaining position. An alternative to the reasonable attorney's
fees award might be prejudgment interest.110
The fabric of this new system would be compulsory liability insurance with
realistic coverage limits. Present minimum liability limits in New York of $10,000
or $20,000 are totally inadequate and out of tune with our modern world. In
addition, the standard liability policy would embrace a compulsory medical
payments feature to fill the need for finances at the early stage when medical
treatment is usually required. Setting coverage limits for medical payments
ought also to be realistic. Finally, in states where loss of earnings are not in
some way compensable in cases of disability,"' a limited loss of earnings in-
surance should be required coverage. An uninsured motorist fund must be in-
cluded in any sensible program to insure compensation to victims of automobile
accidents. These various new sources of compensation (i.e., the medical payment
and loss of earning insurance) would be limited to accidents involving moving
vehicles and would cover the occupants of insured cars only. Moreover, where
the medical payments and loss of earnings insurance are not provided by exist-
ing governmental programs, they should be considered collateral sources off-
setting the total amount of the liability award.
It deserves no more than a casual reference that increased safety innova-
tions and stricter traffic law enforcement are incidents of any complete plan.
108. See N.Y. CPLR § 3012(a). Although N.Y. CPLR § 3042(a) requires that the
service of a bill of particulars be made within ten days after demand, this time limitation
is ineffective because the courts are reluctant to grant an unconditional preclusion order.
Moreover, there is no time limitation requiring the prompt service of a demand for a bill
of particulars. See 3. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice § 3042.12
(1967).
109. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
110. See generally The Case of Prejudgment Interest, 9 Am. Trial Law. Ass'n News-
letter 338 (1966).
111. See N.Y. Work. Comp. Law §§ 200-42 (Supp. 1967). This "Disability Benefits
Law" provides certain scheduled payments for employee disability not necessarily arising
out of and in the course of employment. Computed on the average weekly wage of em-
ployment with his last covered employer, these limited benefits can continue for a period of
twenty-six weeks.
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Also, that certain coverage is required should not preclude maintaining optional
forms of insurance. To encourage this, accounting for collateral sources would
only be required in the specified compulsory forms of coverage. Even if these
ideas do not alleviate court congestion and some of the fraudulent claims that
cause the congestion, it does not seem extravagant to suggest the addition of one
or two members to the local bench. The proper interest should not be economy,
but rather a fair and appropriate system of compensating loss.
VII. Co cusIoN
The Keeton-O'Connell proposal goes too far in certain aspects and not
far enough in others. Their complicated system of exclusions and deductions
leaves them open to justifiable criticism. Their concern for the injured pedestrian
is laudable, but, because of this concern, their program was challenged as an
added inducement for fraudulent claims. The concept of "net economic loss"
lends itself to the interpretation that "basic protection" was no protection at all.
Retaining contributory fault principles to handle liability claims over
certain limits in the face of their severe criticism of the fault system was simply
inconsistent. Moreover, Keeton and O'Connell were content to provide for
voluntary liability insurance to cover judgments over the basic protection
amounts. Disparaging of fault, they would have permitted compensation for
personal irresponsibility. Perhaps these inconsistencies arose because of the
authors' concern for the "practical politics" of obtaining acceptance for such a
proposal. If this is so, it is ironic that this practical aspect is the underlying cause
for the criticism levied against their plan.
Certainly there is much that can be said in favor of the Keeton-O'Connell
proposal, but in its present form it is not the answer. What this proposal has
accomplished is to vitalize the dialogue attempting to remedy the flaws in the
present system. This is a valuable achievement in itself. Hopefully the end
product of the debate will be a fair and workable plan to compensate loss in the
automobile accident area. RoBERT B. CONKLIN
TITLE TO GOODS: THE POSITION OF THE PURCHASER AT
COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Under common law, the bona fide purchaser long received dichotomous
treatment from commercial law. Some complained that the bona fide purchaser
was being protected to the detriment of merchants, while others argued that
the protection afforded the bona fide purchaser should be increased to promote
the free transfer of goods.1 The fact that these arguments were often couched
1. See Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous" and Conflicting
Analysis, 1 Hastings L.J. 111, 121 (1949). He refers to the treatment of bona fide purchasers
as being "Janus-faced."
